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Abstract
This study presents an overlapping-generations model with altruism towards
children. We characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of voting over two
policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the old. The
model potentially generates two types of political equilibria, one favoring public
education and the other favoring social security. One equilibrium is selected by
the government to maximize its objective. It is shown that (i) longevity a¤ects
equilibrium selection and relevant policy choices; and (ii) private education as an
alternative to public education and a Markov-perfect political equilibrium can gen-
erate the two types of equilibria.
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1 Introduction
With increasing life expectancy, many developed countries have experienced a shift to-
wards a progressively older population over the past several decades. This demographic
change has induced an increase in the political power of the elderly, and social security
expenditure for them is expected to increase (Casey et al., 2003). This may imply a
reduction in spending on the young (e.g., public education) because of government bud-
getary constraints (Poterba, 1997, 1998; Fernandez and Rogerson, 2001; Harris, Evans,
and Schwab, 2001).
Such predictions are not always possible when altruistic concern for one's ospring
is considered (Cattaneo and Wolter, 2009). Greater longevity means that parents can
enjoy the human capital of their children longer in later life, making public and private
investment in education more attractive for the working population. In addition, the
eects of the increased political power of the elderly on social security expenditure is not
straightforward. A greater social security burden on the working population discourages
them from investing in education, which may result in a smaller tax base and a lower
level of social security benets in the long run. Furthermore, all these eects interact
with each other. The following question arises: how does a conict of interest between
generations aect political decision-making on social security and public education (and
hence, human capital accumulation) in the long run? This study aims to answer this
question from a political economy viewpoint.
For analysis, this paper presents an overlapping-generations model with uncertain
lifetimes and altruism towards children. In each generation, there are identical individuals
who live for at most three periods: young, middle, and old. An individual produces one
ospring during the middle period and dies at the end of the middle period with some
probability. A middle-age individual is endowed with a stock of human capital that also
denes his/her labor capacity. He/she sets the allocation of disposable income between
his/her personal consumption and investment in furthering the child's education. An
individual who lives throughout old age can receive and consume social security benets.
The level of an ospring's human capital is determined by public education and the
parents' human capital and private investment. Social security and public education are
nanced using taxation on the middle.
Within this framework, we consider a probabilistic voting (a la Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987) in which in each period, the middle and the old participate in voting. Here, the
government in power maximizes a political objective function of the weighted sum of the
utilities of the middle and the old (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1998), Hassler et al.
(2005), and Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2012) for applications for the overlapping
generations models). In particular, this paper restricts its attention to Markov-perfect
1
equilibria, where voters condition their strategies on payo-relevant state variables (i.e.,
human capital in the present model). This concept of equilibrium captures the forward-
looking behavior of the middle, who expect the benet of social security when they reach
old age.
The present model demonstrates two types of political equilibria: the presence of
private investment in education and the absence of public education, and vice versa. In
both equilibria, social security is provided to old individuals. It is shown that the former
equilibrium is realized if the eciency of public education is relatively low compared to
that of private education; otherwise, the latter equilibrium is observed.
Voters' preferences are aected by longevity. In particular, longevity has eects on
the political determination of social security through the following three factors: (i) the
weight on the utility of old-age social security that benets the old; (ii) the tax burden
of the middle to nance the current old-age social security payments; and (iii) the sum
of the weights on the utilities of the ospring's human capital and old-age social security
that are expected to benet the current middle in their old age. The rst factor works to
increase old-age social security, whereas the second factor works to reduce it. The eect
created by the rst factor is oset by that created by the second factor. Therefore, there
remains an eect created by the third factor, which includes the forward-looking behavior
of agents.
The third factor implies a negative eect of longevity on old-age social security. This
somewhat counterintuitive result arises as follows. Greater longevity implies a larger
weight on the utility of old-age social security that the middle receive in their old age.
To maintain a certain level of future social security, the middle must sustain the human-
capital level of their ospring and thus invest privately and/or publicly in education.
Then, the middle have an incentive to reduce the tax burden for old-age social secu-
rity payments today and instead increase private and/or public investment in education.
Therefore, greater longevity results in a lower level of old-age social security.
Longevity also aects public education, but its eect is non-monotone. In a political
equilibrium with public education, greater longevity results in a higher level of public
education spending. However, a further increase in longevity induces voters to prefer
old-age social security to public education and thus to leave educational investment to
the private sector. In other words, a further increase in longevity puts the economy into
a state with no public education. Overall, greater longevity produces a non-monotone
eect on public education spending. This non-monotone eect is peculiar to the present
model that includes two alternatives for educational investments.
This study employs a Markov-perfect equilibrium to demonstrate the forward-looking
behavior of voters. In order to examine the role of this equilibrium concept, we investigate
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an alternative concept of equilibrium, that is, myopic voting, which is often employed in
the literature (see, e.g., Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and Tosun, 2004; Tosun, 2008; Gradstein
and Kaganovich, 2004; Boldrin, 2005). In this voting scheme, voters take future policy as
given. Under this alternative concept, we nd that the model fails to demonstrate a po-
litical equilibrium with the presence of public education. In other words, the model shows
only a political equilibrium with the absence of public education, which is empirically an
implausible scenario. The result suggests that the Markov-perfect equilibrium is key to
demonstrating the two types of political equilibria with empirically relevant properties.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We rst present a literature
review. Thereafter, Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 demonstrates individual
decision-making on education and then characterizes an economic equilibrium. Section 4
demonstrates a period-t political equilibrium. Section 5 investigates how longevity aects
education and social security policies. Section 6 shows the existence and stability of a
steady-state political equilibrium. Section 7 undertakes the analysis using an alternative
assumption of myopic voting. Section 8 concludes.
1.1 Literature Review
The present work can be seen as integrating two bodies of literature. The rst is concerned
with public education as a means of redistribution and its possible eects on human
capital accumulation in political economy models of public education. These models,
however, do not include private educational investment as a choice for individuals (Glomm
and Ravikumar, 1995, 2001; Glomm, 2004; Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004; Boldrin,
2005; Palivos and Varvarigos, 2013). Several studies overcome this issue by comparing an
economy with public education to one with private education (Glomm and Ravikumar,
1992; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993; Gradstein and Justman, 1997; de la Croix and Doepke,
2004) or by considering parents' choice of public and/or private education to maximize
their altruistic utility (Stiglitz, 1974; Epple and Romano, 1996; Gradstein and Justman,
1996; Hoyt and Lee, 1998; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998; Cardak, 2004; Bearse, Glomm,
and Patterson, 2005; de la Croix and Doepke, 2009; Kunze, 2014).
Most of these studies capture public education as public expenditure on children -
nanced by taxation on adults. In other words, they focus on a forward intergenerational
transfer from parents to their children. However, in the real world, there is another inter-
generational transfer that works in the opposite direction: income transfer from the young
to the elderly, such as social security. The present study focuses on this alternative public
spending and investigates how an intergenerational conict over these two policy issues
aects human capital accumulation and the allocation of government spending on public
education and social security through individual decision-making regarding education. In
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particular, the paper sheds light on the role of longevity on political decision-making.
The second body of literature focuses on two-issue voting in the presence of intergen-
erational conict, such as two types of income redistribution. Examples include redistri-
bution within a generation and between dierent generations (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso,
2005; Bassetto, 2008; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008); public goods provision and so-
cial security (Creedy and Moslehi, 2009; Creedy, Li and Moslehi, 2011); public capital and
social security (Konrad, 1995; Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 1999); and medicare services
and social security (Bethencourt and Galasso, 2008). In particular, the present paper is
concerned with works on public education that benets the young and social security that
benets the elderly (Bearse, Glomm, and Janeba, 2001; Soares, 2006; Iturbe-Ormaetxe
and Valera, 2012; Kaganovich and Meier, 2012; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 2012; Naito,
2012). However, these studies assume either a vote over public education for a given
social security benet or over the allocation of tax revenue for a given tax rate. In other
words, the two-dimensional voting aspect is reduced to one dimension. Therefore, these
studies do not indicate how the size of the government (i.e., the tax rate) and the alloca-
tion of government spending between dierent generations are jointly determined through
voting in the presence of an intergenerational conict.
The present study, therefore, attempts to integrate both literatures in an analytical
framework. Some recent works that share these concerns are Kemnitz (2000), Rangel
(2003), Levy (2005), Poutvaara (2006), Bernasconi and Profeta (2012), Gonzalez-Eiras
and Niepelt (2012) and Lancia and Russo (2013). However, these dier from the present
study in that (1) there is no private education as an alternative choice (Kemnitz, 2000;
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2012; Lancia and Russo, 2013) or no human capital accu-
mulation (Rangel, 2003; Levy, 2005), (2) there is a focus on the intragenerational conict
rather than the intergenerational one (Bernasconi and Profeta, 2012), and (3) there is
no analysis on the eect of increasing longevity on the allocation of government spending
(Poutvaara, 2006). By contrast, this paper demonstrates how an intergenerational conict
over two policy issues (i.e., public education and social security) aects human capital
accumulation and the allocation of government spending in the presence of private educa-
tion as an alternative to public education. The paper then shows that private education
as an alternative to public education and forward-looking behavior of voters are key to
demonstrating the two types of political equilibria.
2 The Model
We consider a discrete-time overlapping-generations model that starts at time 0: Individ-
uals live for at most three periods: young, middle, and old. An individual dies at the end
of his/her middle age with probability 1 p and lives throughout old age with probability
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p 2 (0; 1). A higher p means greater longevity, which is interpreted as population aging.1
Young and middle individuals are identical within each generation, and each middle indi-
vidual produces one ospring.2 There is no population growth, and the number of young
individuals is assumed to be constant. Young individuals are economically inactive except
that they consume education.
Consider a middle individual at time t (i.e., generation t). He/she is endowed with
a stock of human capital ht, which also denes his/her labor capacity. Given the labor
income tax t, a middle individual sets his/her allocation of disposable income ((1 t)ht)
between consumption in the middle period (cmt ) and private investment in his/her child's
further education (zt) subject to the budget constraint:
cmt + zt  (1  t)ht:
In old age, an individual receives social security bt+1 and consumes it. The budget con-
straint in old age is
cot+1  bt+1;
where cot+1 denotes consumption in old age. We assume that there is no means of storing
private goods for old-age consumption.3 Figure 1 depicts the structure of the model.
[Figure 1 here.]
The level of the ospring's human capital, ht+1, is determined by the parent's human
capital, ht;material private input, zt; and public expenditure on education, et. The human
capital production function is assumed to have the following form:
ht+1 = A  (ht)  (zt + (1  )et) ;
where A,  and  are constant and satisfy A > 0,  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1);  2 (0; 1), and
 +  2 (0; 1): The function implies that private input zt is a perfect substitute for the
publicly provided input et.
4
1There are two aspects of population aging: an increase in longevity, which is basically out of the
control of individuals, and a decline in fertility rates, which is the outcome of individual decision-making.
The current study focuses on the former aspect to examine the eect of an exogenous change in the
demographic structure on education and social security policies via voting.
2Given the assumption of identical individuals within a generation, we ignore intragenerational political
conict in the present study. Instead, we focus on the conict between generations.
3This assumption is unusual in the literature, but it enables us to demonstrate the intergenerational
conict over the two policy issues (i.e., public education for the young and social security for the old) in
a tractable manner.
4In general, private education serves as a substitute and a complement to public education (Glomm
and Kaganovich, 2003; Bearse, Glomm, and Patterson, 2005). The latter role is not included in the
present analysis.
5
The assumption  2 (0; 1) implies that public education is less ecient than private
education is. In other words, the rate of return to investment in public education is
lower than that in private education (Gradstein and Justman, 1996). This assumption
reects the fact that public education provides standardized (rather than individualized)
education to each child. Because of this uniformity of public school education, each
child is unable to receive the type of education suitable for his or her needs. The lack
of individualized education programs in public education results in a lower return to
investment compared to private education.
An individual in generation t derives utility from consumption in middle and old ages,
cmt and c
o
t+1, respectively, and from his/her child's anticipated future income, ht+1: We
assume that parents do not care about the welfare of their children and only about their
human capital. Generation t's preferences are specied by the following expected lifetime
utility function:
ln cmt + p 

 lnht+1 + (1  ) ln cot+1
	
;
where  2 (0; 1) and 1  denote the relative weights on the utility of the child's anticipated
future income and of old-age consumption, respectively. A middle individual in generation
t chooses cmt and zt to maximize his/her expected lifetime utility subject to the budget
constraints in the middle and old ages given (1  t)ht; bt+1; and et:
In each period, the government raises tax revenues to nance the provision of uni-
form public schooling for all children, et, and social security, bt. The government budget
constraint is given by
tht = et + pbt;
where tht is tax revenue from the middle, et is public expenditure on education, and pbt
is expenditure on social security (here, the expenditure on social security, bt, is multiplied
by p because the number of old individuals is p in each period).
The timing of events in period t is as follows. First, middle and old individuals vote
on the tax rate (t) and on expenditures on public education and social security (et and
bt, respectively). Second, each middle individual sets an allocation of disposable income
between consumption and private education subject to his/her budget constraints. We
solve the model using backward induction in the following two sections.
3 Economic Equilibrium
This section demonstrates a middle individual's decision on consumption and private
investment in education and its consequence for utility and human capital accumulation.
Thus, we rst dene the economic equilibrium as the outcome of a middle individual's
utility-maximizing behavior.
6
Denition 1. Given a sequence of tax rates and the sizes of redistribution and pub-
lic education, ft; et; btg1t=0, an economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations,
fcmt ; zt; cot ; ht+1g1t=0, with an initial condition h0(> 0) such that (i) in each period,
a middle individual maximizes his/her lifetime utility subject to the budget con-
straints, non-negativity constraint of investment in private education, and the hu-
man capital production function, and (ii) the government budget is balanced in each
period.
The problem of a middle individual in period t is as follows:
max
cmt ;zt2[0;(1 t)ht]
ln cmt + p

 lnht+1 + (1  ) ln cot+1
	
subject to
cmt + zt  (1  t)ht;
cot+1  bt+1;
ht+1 = A  (ht)  (zt + (1  )et) ;
given ht; t; bt+1 and et,
where the rst and second constraints are the budget constraints in middle and old ages,
respectively, and the third constraint is the human capital production function.
Solving the utility maximization problem leads to the following private education
decision:
zt = max

0;
1
1 + p
[p(1  t)ht   (1  )et]

: (1)
Equation (1) indicates that the investment decision depends on an individual's human
capital ht and on government policy variables t and et: In particular, a middle individual
chooses to invest privately in education if his/her human capital is high, the tax rate is
low, and/or the level of public education is low. Otherwise, he/she chooses no private
investment in education and spends disposable income for his/her own consumption.
Therefore, the consumption function in middle age is given by
cmt = min

(1  t)ht; 1
1 + p
[(1  t)ht + (1  )et]

;
where the rst and second arguments in the brackets correspond to consumption when
z = 0 and z > 0; respectively.
Equation (1) indicates that a middle individual invests in education if and only if
p(1   t)ht   (1   )et > 0: Using the government budget constraint, the condition is
rewritten as follows:
zt > 0, ht >

1  
p
+ 1

 et + pbt:
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This condition states that lower levels of public education and social security benets
produce a larger income eect, thereby giving a middle individual incentive to invest
more in education.
Considering the condition zt > 0, we can write the indirect utility function of a middle
individual as follows:
V mt =
8<: V
m
t;z>0 if ht >

1 
p
+ 1

et + pbt;
V mt;z=0 if ht 

1 
p
+ 1

et + pbt;
where V mz>0 and V
m
z=0 are the indirect utility functions of a period-t middle-aged individual
born in the previous period (i.e., period t 1) when zt > 0 and zt = 0, respectively. These
are given by
V mt;z>0 = (1 + p) ln (ht   et   pbt) + p(1  ) ln bt+1
+

ln
1
1 + p
+ p ln
p
1 + p
+ p lnA+ p lnht

; (2)
V mt;z=0 = ln(ht   et   pbt) + p ln et + p(1  ) ln bt+1
+ [p lnA+ p ln(1  ) + p lnht] : (3)
The old do not make an economic decision. They receive social security benets and
consume them. In addition, they receive the utility of their ospring's human-capital
level. The indirect utility of an old individual alive at time t is as follows:
V ot = (1  ) ln bt +  lnht; (4)
where the rst and second terms on the right-hand side represent the utilities of social
security and the ospring's human capital, respectively.
Using the government budget constraint and the condition zt > 0, the human capital
production equation is given by the following:
ht+1 = H(ht; et; bt) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
Hz>0(ht; et; bt)  A(ht)
h
p
1+p
(ht   et   pbt)
i
if ht >

1 
p
+ 1

et + pbt;
Hz=0(ht; et)  A(ht) [(1  )et]
if ht 

1 
p
+ 1

et + pbt:
(5)
Equation (5) implies that there exists a critical level of human capital, ((1  ) =p + 1) et+
pbt; that determines educational investment behavior. For a given set of policy variables,
e and b, human capital accumulates according to the rst equation in (5) when the stock
of human capital is above the critical level. In addition, it evolves according to the second
equation in (5) when the stock of human capital is below the critical level. The criti-
cal level depends on public education and social security, both of which are determined
through voting (as demonstrated in the next section).
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4 Political Equilibrium
Public education e and old-age social security b are determined by individuals through a
political process. Elections occur every period, and all middle and old individuals cast a
ballot on e and b. Individuals' preferences for the two policy issues are represented by the
indirect utility functions in Eqs. (2) and (3) for the middle and by those in Eq. (4) for
the old.
The issue space is bi-dimensional, and thus, a majoritarian voting game equilibrium
may not exist. To resolve this problem, the present paper assumes probabilistic voting
a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) in the demonstration of the political mechanisms. In
each period, the middle and the old participate in voting, and the government in power
maximizes a political objective function that reects the preferences of the middle and
the old. Formally, the political objective function in period t is given by the following:

t = pV
o
t + V
m
t ;
where p (attached to the utility of the old, V ot ) is the relative weight of the old measured as
a percentage of the population in the economy. The government's problem is maximizing

t subject to the human capital production function, Eq. (5), given ht:
5
This study restricts its attention to a Markov-perfect equilibrium as described in
Krusell, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997) and applied to a political economy analysis (e.g.,
Grossman and Helpman, 1998; Hassler et al., 2003, 2005; Hassler, Storesletten, and Zili-
botti, 2007; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008, 2012; Song, 2011, 2012; Song, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti, 2012). Voters condition their strategies only on payo-relevant state vari-
ables. In the current framework, human capital h is the payo-relevant state variable.
Therefore, the expected level of social security for the next period included in the utility
function of the middle, V mt , is given by bt+1 = ~B(ht+1) : <++ ! <+: We can now dene
a period-t political equilibrium as follows:
Denition 2. A period-t political equilibrium is a pair of functions, fB;Eg, where B
and E are two policy rules, bt = B(ht) : <++ ! <+ and et = E(ht) : <++ ! <+,
respectively, such that (i) B and E are solutions to the government's problem for a
given expectation of bt+1 = ~B(ht+1) and (ii) ~B = B holds.
Next, we characterize a period-t political equilibrium, that is, a voting outcome in some
period t. For this purpose, we seek the voters' preferred policies when zt > 0 (Section 4.1)
and zt = 0 (Section 4.2). In Section 4.3, we summarize the two cases to characterize a
5An explicit microfoundation for this model is explained in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 3)
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, Appendix). Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012, Appendix B)
show the process of deriving the political objective function in an overlapping generations framework.
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period-t political equilibrium. Section 4.4 examines how the period-t political equilibrium
outcome is aected by the increased longevity of agents. In Section 4.5, we review the
long-run consequences and show the existence and stability of a steady-state political
equilibrium.
4.1 Voters' Preferred Policy When zt > 0
Suppose that a middle individual in period t invests a portion of his/her disposable income
in education: zt > 0. Because the preferences are specied by the logarithmic utility
function, we conjecture a linear policy function of social security in period t + 1 : bt+1 =
B0  ht+1, where B0 2 (0;1) is a constant parameter. Under this conjecture, the social
security benet is given by the following:
bt+1 = B0AHz(ht; et; bt)
= B0A (ht)


p
1 + p

(ht   et   pbt) ; (6)
where the second line is derived using the equation of human capital production (5).
Under the assumption of zt > 0 and the expectation of bt+1 in (6), the objective
function of the period-t government becomes

t;z>0 = p(1  ) ln bt + (1 + p) ln (ht   et   pbt) ;
where unrelated terms are omitted from the expression. The rst term on the right-
hand side, (1   ) ln bt, denotes the utility of social security benets for the period-t
old weighted by the number of old, p. The second term denotes the expected utility of
the period-t middle. In particular, it is the sum of the utilities of their consumption
((1 + p) ln (ht   et   pbt)) and social security benets they receive in their old age,
p(1   ) ln (ht   et   pbt). The latter benet is specic to the model considering the
Markov-perfect political equilibrium.
The problem of the government in period t is choosing a pair of (bt; et) that maximize

t;z>0. The rst-order conditions with respect to et and bt are
et : (1 + p)
 
ht   et   pbt  0;
bt :
p(1  )
bt
= (1 + p)
p
ht   et   pbt :
These conditions lead to
et = 0 and bt =
1  
1 + p ((1  ) + )ht: (7)
Therefore, B = ~B holds if B0 = (1   )  (1 + p ((1  ) + )) 1. That is, function (7)
constitutes a period-t political equilibrium as long as B0 = (1 )  (1+p ((1  ) + )) 1.
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We substitute the solution in (7) into the condition zt > 0 in (5) and nd that the
condition holds for any ht > 0.
6 The result established thus far is summarized as follows.
Lemma 1. For any ht > 0; there is a solution to the period-t government problem
distinguished by zt > 0; et = 0 and bt = (1  )  (1 + p ((1  ) + )) 1  ht:
The result in Lemma 1 implies that given the expectation that the middle invest pri-
vately in education, the government nds it optimal to invest nothing in public education
and to use all tax revenue for old-age social security for any level of ht. Faced with this
government policy, the middle choose to invest privately in education to maximize util-
ity. Zero public investment in education, which seems to be an extreme result, is partly
because of the specications of the utility and human capital production functions. How-
ever, it may be viewed as demonstrating an economy where government spending is in
favor of old-age social security.
4.2 Voters' Preferred Policy When zt = 0
Alternatively, suppose that a middle individual in period t privately invests nothing in
education: zt = 0. Following the same procedure as in the case of zt > 0, we conjecture
a linear function of social security in period t + 1 : bt+1 = B1  ht+1 where B1 2 (0;1) is
a constant parameter. Under this conjecture, the social security benet is given by
bt+1 = B1A(ht)
(1  )(et):
The objective function of the period t government becomes

t;z=0 = p(1  ) ln bt + ln (ht   et   pbt) + p ln et;
where unrelated terms are omitted from the expression. The rst term on the right-hand
side, (1 ) ln bt, denotes the utility of social security benets for period-t old weighted by
the number of old, p. The second term denotes the utility of consumption for the period-t
middle, and the third term is part of the expected utility of old-age social security for the
period-t middle.
The problem for the government in period t is choosing a pair of (bt; et) that maximize

t;z=0. The rst-order conditions with respect to bt and et are
et :
1
ht   et   pbt =
p
et
;
bt :
p(1  )
bt
=
p
ht   et   pbt :
6The condition zt > 0 becomes
zt > 0, ht >

1  
p
+ 1

et + pbt , 1 > p(1  )
1 + p ((1  ) + ) :
The last inequality holds for any set of parameters.
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These conditions lead to
et =
p
1 + p ((1  ) + )ht and bt =
1  
1 + p ((1  ) + )ht: (8)
Therefore, B = ~B if B1 = (1  )  (1 + p ((1  ) + )) 1:
Plugging the solution in (8) into the condition zt = 0, we nd that zt = 0 holds if and
only if   1   ,   1   holds. Therefore, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 2. Suppose that   1  holds. Then, for any ht > 0; there is a solution to the
period-t government problem distinguished by zt = 0; et = p (1+p ((1  ) + )) 1 
ht and bt = (1  )  (1 + p ((1  ) + )) 1  ht:
The result in Lemma 2 states that given the expectation that the middle privately
invest nothing into education, the government nds it optimal to use a part of the tax
revenue for public education as long as the eciency of public education is suciently high
that   1 . Here, a lower  implies a higher eciency of public education. Faced with
this policy, the middle chooses to privately invest nothing into education to maximize
utility. Compared to the result in Lemma 1, the result in Lemma 2 demonstrates an
economy with government spending in favor of public education.
4.3 Period-t Political Equilibrium
The results in Lemmas 1 and 2 suggest that there is a unique solution distinguished by
z > 0 if  > 1   ; furthermore, there may exist two solutions distinguished by z > 0
and z = 0 if   1   . The case   1    implies that there are two local maxima for
the political objective function. The government can choose the better of the two local
maxima by controlling policies.
To select the equilibrium for the case   1  , we substitute the policy functions in
Eq. (7) when z > 0 and in Eq. (8) when z = 0 into the political objective functions 
z>0
and 
z=0, respectively. For a given ht, we have the following relation:

t;z>0 R 
t;z=0 , V mt;z>0 R V mt;z=>0;
where V mt;z>0 and V
m
t;z=>0 are dened in (2) and (3), respectively. This relation holds
because the old-age social security functions are equivalent in both cases (z > 0 and
z = 0) for a given ht. Thus, V
o
t when z > 0 is equal to V
o
t when z = 0.
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Using a direct calculation, we obtain7
V mt;z>0 R V mt;z=>0 ,  R 1    (p); (9)
where (p) is dened as
(p) 

1 + p
1 + p
(1+p)=p
> 1;
and 1   > 1    (p) holds. Therefore, we can conclude that the government chooses
the policy in Lemma 1 if  2 (1     (p); 1); that in Lemma 2 if  2 (0; 1    (p)),
and is indierent between the two if  = 1     (p). The result is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Period-t political equilibrium)
(i) If  > 1   (p); there exists a unique period-t political equilibrium with zt > 0 and
et = 0:
(ii) If  = 1    (p); there are two period-t political equilibria: one is distinguished by
zt > 0 and et = 0, and the other is distinguished by zt = 0 and et > 0:
(iii) If  < 1     (p); there exists a unique period-t political equilibrium with zt = 0
and et > 0:
Figure 2 illustrates the conditions  R 1   and  R 1   (p) in a    space. The
condition  > 1    (p) indicates that given , obtaining the equilibrium with zt > 0 is
positively correlated with the size of . Greater parental interest in the child's education
gives the parents a stronger motivation for providing education. Given the property that
private education is a perfect substitute for public education, parents nd it optimal to
privately provide education and to use tax revenue for old-age social security instead of
for public education. Therefore, the economy realizes an equilibrium where education is
provided in private-sector institutions when  > 1    (p) holds.
7Using this direct calculation, we have
V mt;z>0 R V mt;z=>0 , (1 + p) ln
1 + p
1 + p
+ p ln  R p ln(1  )
, ln

1 + p
1 + p
(1+p)
+ ln ()
p R ln(1  )p
,

1 + p
1 + p
(1+p)
()
p R (1  )p
,

1 + p
1 + p
(1+p)=p
 R 1  :
Using the denition of (p) in the text, we obtain (9).
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The condition  > 1  (p) also indicates that given , the equilibrium with zt > 0 is
positively correlated with , that is, it is negatively correlated with the relative eciency
of public education. As previously mentioned, public education is a perfect substitute for
private education, but the former is less ecient and thus more costly than the latter.
However, for the middle-aged voters, public education acts as a collective mechanism to
increase the average human capital of subsequent generations and their old-age pension
benets. Middle-aged voters examine the costs and benets of public education and nd
that costs are larger (smaller) than benets when the eciency of public education is
below (above) the critical value, denoted by   (p). Eventually, middle-aged voters
choose private education rather than public education when  is suciently high that
1   <   (p) (i.e.,  > 1    (p)). Furthermore, they choose public education when
 is suciently low that 1   >   (p) (i.e.,  < 1    (p)).
[Figure 2 here.]
The situation described thus far is somewhat extreme, because it lacks either public
or private education. However, this situation demonstrates two types of states in the real
world: states with a high and low share of private education in the total education expen-
diture, respectively. The equilibrium with z > 0 (z = 0) can be viewed as demonstrating
the former (latter) state. To examine the plausibility of these situations, we review data
on OECD countries (OECD, 2013, Education at a glance 2013). Table 1 shows the relative
proportions of private and public expenditure on educational institutions for all levels of
education in 2010. Panel (a) presents the list of countries with an over-25 % share of
private education; Panel (b) presents the list of countries with an under-10% share.
[Table 1 here.]
The evidence suggests that the group of countries with high shares of private education
includes Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
and East-Asian countries (Japan and Korea)8. The group of countries with low shares
includes European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ire-
land, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden). One interpretation of this evidence is that countries
in the former group features low eciency of public education and/or larger concern of
parents regarding the education of their children. Alternatively, countries in the latter
group feature high eciency of public education. In other words, the degree of eciency
of public education and parental motivation for education tend to aect decision making
on education and the choice of redistribution policies. Furthermore, they are keys to
8An exception is Chile with a 42.1% share. The share is 24.2% in Canada, which can plausibly be
included in the group of Anglo-Saxon countries.
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explaining cross-country dierence in the composition of education expenditures. This is
a testable implication of the theory, which should be conrmed by empirical evaluation
in future work.
5 Eects of Longevity
The analysis and results thus far suggest that longevity, represented by the parameter
p, aects the equilibrium policies and characterizations demonstrated in Section 4. To
investigate the longevity eects in more detail, we rst consider the eect of an increase
in p on the equilibrium policies e and b for the cases z > 0 and z = 0 in Proposition
2. Then, we provide an interpretation of the results, examine the eects of an increase
in p on the threshold condition in (9), and show the overall eect of longevity on public
education spending around the threshold condition. Finally, we compare our results to
previous results and ndings.
The following proposition summarizes the eect of greater longevity on the equilibrium
policies.
Proposition 2. Consider a period-t political equilibrium.
(i) Greater longevity results in a lower level of old-age social security.
(ii) Suppose that z = 0 holds. Greater longevity results in a higher level of public edu-
cation spending.
To understand the mechanism behind the result, we recall the political objective func-
tion when z > 0:

t;z>0 = p|{z}
(a:i)
(1  ) ln bt + (1 + p|{z}
(a:iii)
) ln
0@ht   et   pbt|{z}
(a:ii)
1A :
Longevity aects the determinants of old-age social security using the following three
factors: (a.i) the weight on the utility of old-age social security that benets the current
old; (a.ii) the tax burden of the middle required to nance the current old-age social
security payments; and (a.iii) the sum of the weights on the utilities of consumption,
the ospring's human capital, and old-age social security expected to benet the current
middle in their old age. In the present specication of the model, the eect created by
the rst factor is oset by that created by the second one. Therefore, the eect produced
by the third factor remains.
The third factor includes the discipline eect exercised by the middle voters. Greater
longevity implies a larger weight on the utility of old-age social security that they will
15
receive in their old age. To maintain a certain level of social security benets, they need to
sustain the human capital level of their ospring and thus need to invest privately and/or
publicly in education. Therefore, the middle have an incentive to reduce the tax burden
for old-age social security and to increase private and/or public investment in education
in response to an increase in longevity. Therefore, greater longevity results in a lower
level of old-age social security.
To conrm that a similar result is obtained for the case z = 0, recall the political
objective function when z = 0:

t;z=0 = p(1  )| {z }
(b:i)
ln bt + ln
0@ht   et   pbt|{z}
(b:ii)
1A+ p|{z}
(b:iii)
ln et:
Similar to the case z > 0, longevity has eects on the determination of old-age social
security and public education through the following three factors: (b.i) the weight on
the utility of old-age social security that benets the old; (b.ii) the tax burden on the
middle to nance the current old-age social security payments; and (b.iii) the sum of the
weights on the utilities of the ospring's human capital and old-age social security that is
expected to benet the current middle in their old age. As in the case z > 0; we nd that
the eect created by the rst factor is oset by that created by the second factor. The
remaining factor, that is, the third factor, shows that greater longevity means a larger
weight on public education. Therefore, we can conclude that greater longevity results in
a larger level of public education spending and thus a lower level of old-age social security
for the case z = 0:
This analysis and its results suggest a monotone eect of longevity on old-age social
security. However, the eect on public education is not straightforward, because public
education spending increases with longevity when z = 0; however, there is no public
education spending when z > 0: To understand the overall eect, we must investigate
how an increase in p aects the threshold condition  = 1    (p) in (9).
To see the eect of p on the threshold condition, we show the conditions for the three
values of p in Figure 2 using a graph. The corresponding values of p are p = 0:2; 0:6; and
0:99: The gure suggests that the equilibrium with z > 0 is more likely to be obtained
with high longevity. A higher p implies a larger weight on old-age social security in the
political objective function. Therefore, voters tend to prefer old-age social security to
public education and to leave educational investment to the private sector as longevity
increases.
Combining the results in Proposition 2 with the numerical results demonstrated in
Figure 2, we obtain the following implication of longevity for public education. For a low
p such that the middle privately invest nothing in education, an increase in p results in a
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higher level of public education spending. However, a further increase in p results in no
spending on public education, because the equilibrium allocation is changed from the one
distinguished by z = 0 and e > 0 (as in Lemma 2) to that distinguished by z > 0 and
e = 0 (as in Lemma 1) in response to an increase in longevity. That is, greater longevity
produces a non-monotone eect on public education. This non-monotone eect is peculiar
to the present model that includes two alternatives for educational investment.
The positive eect of aging on public education shown in Proposition 2(ii) is in line
with the theoretical predictions in the literature. Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) show
an overall positive impact of increasing longevity on public education funding. Levy
(2005) shows a relatively high level of per-capita public provision of education when the
young are a minority in the population. In addition, the negative eect of aging on social
security shown in Proposition 2(i) is in line with the prediction in the model by Razin,
Sadka, and Swagel (2002).
These theoretical predictions are somewhat counterintuitive, and one might expect
that aging voters show less support for public education that does not directly benet the
old and place more emphasis on social security. However, empirical investigations suggest
that the ndings are mixed regarding the eect of aging on public education (see Cattaneo
and Wolter, 2009, for a literature survey). In addition, Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002)
show that aging has a negative impact on social security in the United States and in some
European countries. The predictions of the present model can therefore provide a possible
explanation for these counterintuitive ndings.
6 Steady-state Equilibrium
Having established the period-t political equilibrium, we now investigate the law of motion
of human capital in the political equilibrium. In particular, we examine the existence and
stability of a steady-state political equilibrium, where ht = ht+1 holds. Thus, we compute
the human capital production equation by substituting the policy when zt > 0 (7) into
ht+1 = Hz>0() in (5) and that when zt = 0 (8) into ht+1 = Hz=0() in (5). Thus, we
obtain
ht+1 =
8><>: Hz>0(ht)  A

p
1+p
 
1+p
(1 )+

(ht)
+ if zt > 0;
Hz=0(ht)  A

(1 )p
(1 )+

(ht)
+ if zt = 0;
(10)
where Hz>0 and Hz=0 are strictly increasing and strictly concave in h with Hz>0(0) =
0; Hz=0(0) = 0; limh!1H 0z>0() = 0; and limh!1H 0z=0() = 0:
Given the result in Proposition 1, we can write the law of motion of human capital as
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follows:
ht+1 =
8<:
Hz>0(ht) if  > 1    (p)
fHz>0(ht); Hz=0(ht)g if  = 1    (p)
Hz=0(ht) if  < 1    (p):
Using this motion, we obtain the following result regarding the existence and stability of
the steady-state political equilibrium.
Proposition 3.
(i) If  > 1    (p), there exists a unique and stable steady-state political equilibrium
with z > 0 and e = 0.
(ii) If  = 1   (p), there are multiple steady-state political equilibria: the steady state
with z > 0 and e = 0 and that with z = 0 and e > 0.
(iii) If  < 1    (p), there exists a unique and stable steady-state political equilibrium
with z = 0 and e > 0.
The result in Proposition 3 implies that there is a unique political equilibrium path
that stably converges to the steady state with z > 0 and e = 0 when  > 1    (p). In
addition, there is a unique political equilibrium path that stably converges to the steady
state with z = 0 and e > 0 when  < 1     (p). Multiple steady-state equilibria arise
only when  = 1     (p). In this case, the economy either experiences a monotone
convergence to either state or oscillates between the two equilibria, depending on the
choice of the government in each period.
Figure 3 illustrates two numerical examples of the human capital production equation
when   1 . In this situation, there are two solutions to the government problem. The
government selects one of solution to maximize the objective. In each panel, a solid curve
(dashed curve) presents an equation of human capital production realized (not realized)
in equilibrium in accordance with the government's selected (non-selected) policy.
[Figure 3 here.]
In the present model, no switch occurs between the state with z > 0 and e = 0 and
that with z = 0 and e > 0 along the equilibrium path for most sets of parameters. We
observe a switch between the two states only when  = 1     (p) holds. Therefore,
a question arises as to whether it is possible to show a switch between the two states
along an equilibrium path for a larger set of parameters. To answer this question, we
can assume that  depends on the human capital level, ht. For example, assume that
 is decreasing in ht: the return on investment from public education increases as the
human capital level increases. This assumption implies that productivity (or eciency)
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of public education increases as the teachers' level in public schools (represented by the
human capital level in the economy) increases.
Under this assumption, we can nd a critical value of ht, denoted by h^. For ht < h^, the
condition  > 1    (p) is satised: there exists a unique equilibrium path with z > 0.
For ht > h^, the condition  < 1 (p) is satised: there exists a unique equilibrium path
with z = 0: Therefore, we can predict that the economy attains a political equilibrium
distinguished by z > 0 and e = 0 when ht is below the critical value and one distinguished
by z = 0 and e > 0 when ht is above the critical value. A switch from the state with
z > 0 and e = 0 to that with z = 0 and e > 0 may occur along the equilibrium path.
However, the plausibility of this prediction should be tested in an empirical manner, which
is beyond the scope of the present study.
Another assumption may demonstrate the switch between the two states. For example,
it is plausible to assume that longevity, represented by parameter p, is increasing in
the human capital level, ht (see, e.g., Castello-Climent and Domenech, 2008). However,
this assumption does not satisfy the Markov property for a given conjecture of a linear
social security function, bt+1 = ~B(ht+1) = B0  ht+1, where B0 is a constant parameter.
That is, the period-t social security function, bt = B(ht), becomes bt = (1   )  (1 +
p(ht)  ((1  ) + )) 1  ht:, which is a nonlinear function of ht: ~B() is not equal to
B(). Therefore, the assumption that p is dependent on ht is not available in the present
framework.
7 Myopic Voting
Thus far, we have focused on the Markov-perfect political equilibrium of a voting game
over two policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the old. In
order to examine the role of this equilibrium concept, this section introduces an alternative
political equilibrium concept adopted by many studies: myopic voting, where voters today
take future policy as given (e.g., Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004; Holz-Eakin, Lovely,
and Tosun, 2004; Boldrin, 2005; Tosun, 2008; Kaganovich and Meier, 2012). Under this
alternative voting that does not include the forward-looking behavior of agents, we nd
that the model demonstrates only one type of equilibrium with z > 0 and e = 0.
Under the myopic voting assumption, the objective of the period t government is to
choose (et,bt) to maximize 
t, which is dened by

t =
8<: 
z>0  p ln bt + (1 + p) ln(ht   et   pbt) if ht >

1 
p
+ 1

et + pbt;

z=0  p ln bt + ln(ht   et   pbt) + p ln et if ht >

1 
p
+ 1

et + pbt:
The function 
t does not include the term p ln bt+1, representing the utility of social
security benets in the next period as a politically relevant variable, because myopic voters
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today (i.e., in period t) take the next-period policy as given. In other words, we do not
include the intertemporal eect of current policy on next-period social security through
the human capital accumulation equation from the analysis. Therefore, the equation of
human capital accumulation that appeared as a constraint in the previous sections is not
considered in the current problem formulation.
Following the same procedure as in Section 4, we consider the cases z > 0 and z = 0.
First, suppose that z > 0 holds. The problem of the period-t government is as follows:
max
bt;et
p ln bt + (1 + p) ln(ht   et   pbt):
The solution to this problem is
(et; bt) =

0;
1
1 + p(1 + )
ht

:
Plugging in the solution to the condition zt > 0; we have
ht >

1  
p
+ 1

 0 + p 1
1 + p(1 + )
ht:
This condition holds for any ht : there always exists a political equilibrium with z > 0.
Next, suppose that z = 0 holds. The problem of the period-t government is
max
bt;et
p ln bt + ln(ht   et   pbt) + p ln et:
The solution to the problem is
(et; bt) =

p
1 + p(1 + )
ht;
1
1 + p(1 + )
ht

:
We substitute the solution into the condition z = 0 and obtain
zt = 0, 0   ;
which never holds. Therefore, we can conclude that
Proposition 4. Suppose that voters are myopic in the sense that they take future policy
as given. Then, there exists a unique political equilibrium distinguished by z > 0
and e = 0.
Why is it impossible to have an equilibrium with no private investment, z = 0? In
order to answer this question, we recall the condition z = 0 in (5):
ht 

1  
p
+ 1

et + pbt:
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For a given h, this condition requires high levels of public education and social security,
both of which give individuals a disincentive to privately invest in education. However,
myopic voting results in a high level of social security but a low level of public education.
Moreover, the former eect is outweighed by the latter, and thus, the condition z = 0
fails to hold for any h. The model fails to show an economy distinguished by sucient
public support for education, which is an implausible scenario from an empirical point
of view. The result in this subsection therefore suggests that there is a need to capture
the forward-looking behavior of agents, which is peculiar to the Markov-perfect political
equilibrium when we consider the two-dimensional voting on public education and old-age
social security.
8 Conclusion
This paper developed an overlapping-generations model with altruism toward children
and considers voting over two policy issues, public education for the young and social
security for the old. In the model, there is a conict of interest between generations over
these policy issues. The analysis shows that the two types of political equilibria exist in
the model: one with private (but not public) education and the other with public (but not
private) education. In both equilibria, social security is provided to all old individuals.
One of the two equilibria is selected by the government to maximize its objective.
This study rst shows that longevity critically aects this selection. In addition, greater
longevity results in a lower level of old-age social security in both equilibria and a higher
level of spending on public education in the equilibrium with public education. These
results imply that longevity produces a non-monotone eect on the provision of public
education.
This study also shows the role of the forward-looking behavior assumption of agents,
which is peculiar to the Markov-perfect political equilibrium. When we remove this as-
sumption and alternatively assume myopic behavior, the model fails to show an economy
distinguished by the presence of public education. In other words, the economy attains
only an equilibrium distinguished by the absence of public education, which is empiri-
cally an implausible scenario. Therefore, the present analysis sheds light on the role of
the Markov-perfect equilibrium in demonstrating two types of equilibria reecting cross-
country dierences in public education and social security.
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Figure 1: The structure of the model.
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Figure 2: The dashed line presents  = 1 : The curves present  = 1 

1+p
1+p
(1+p)=(p)
for three values of p : p = 0:2; 0:6 and 0:99.
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Table 1: Relative proportions of public and private expenditure on educational institutions
for all levels of education (2010 year). Panel (a) is the list of countries where the share of
private education is more than 25% ; Panel (b) is the list of countries where the share of
private education is below 10%.
Source: OECD (2013) Education at a glance 2013: OECD indicators, OECD Publishing.
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Figure 3: In each panel, a solid curve presents an equation of human capital production
which is realized in equilibrium in accordance with a selected policy by the government;
and a dashed curve presents one which is not realized in equilibrium because the cor-
responding policy is not selected by the government. The parameter values are set at
A = 2:0; p = 0:8;  = 0:5;  = 0:4 and  = 0:3: Panel (a) with  = 0:3 illustrates the result
in Proposition 3(i); and Panel (b) with  = 0:1 illustrates the result in Proposition 3(iii).
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